All the Shah′s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror

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aDLC |beng |erda |cDLC |dUKM |dBAKER |dYDXCP |dC#P |dBTCTA |dIAK |dKAAUA |dBDX |dUKMGB |dCTB |dCHVBK |dOCLCF |dOCL |dNYP |dOCLCQ |dOCL |dOCLCQ |dUW3 |dOCLCO |dAUD |dOCLCA |dDHA |dKJ6 |dOCLCQ |dCSJ |dOCLCQ |dOCLCA |dIOK |dMNI |dUKUOY |dOCLCQ |dOCLCA |dOCL |dMM9 |dOCLCQ |dJYJ |dOCLCO |dCOM The US and UK were at odds in the early 1950's. Truman did not support prolonging empires, called by Secretary of State Dean Acheson 'whiff of grapeshot diplomacy'. PM Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin delayed invasion, unable to secure US and UN approval. Once Churchill and Eisenhower were in power the tables turned. United under pro-capitalism and anti-communism they defeated Iranian aspirations, later ushering in the Islamic state. Kinzer tells the story well. With his fast-paced narrative and deep ferreting out of the facts, Kinzer reassembles the CIA's 1953 coup of Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected leader of Iran in favor of the bloodthirsty dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Shah, who is believed to have been a puppet for the US government.

The press played the showdown like a prize fight, "the tremulous, crotchety Premier versus Britain′s super–suave representative, Sir Gladwyn Jebb," in Newsweek′s account. The Daily News groused, "Whether Mossy is a phony or a genuine tear–jerker, he better put everything he′s got into his show if he goes on television here." Time magazine had made him its Man of the Year. Now came "the decisive act in the dramatic, tragic and sometimes ridiculous drama that began when Iran nationalized the Anglo–American Oil Co. five months ago." Kinzer′s brisk, vivid account is filled with beguiling details like these, but he stumbles a bit when it comes to Operation Ajax′s wider significance. Kinzer shrewdly points out that 1953 helps explain (if not excuse) the Islamist revolutionaries′ baffling decision to take American hostages in 1979; the hostage–takers feared that the C.I.A. might save the shah yet again and, in part, seized prisoners as insurance. One mullah – Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, now Iran′s supreme leader – warned at the time, "We are not liberals like Allende and Mossadegh, whom the C.I.A. can snuff I out." Kinzer also notes that the 1953 conspiracy plunged the C.I.A. into the regime–change business, leading to coups in Guatemala, Chile and South Vietnam, as well as to the Bay of Pigs.That the past is prolog is especially true in this astonishing account of the 1953 overthrow of nationalist Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh, who became prime minister in 1951 and immediately nationalized the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company. This act angered the British, who sought assistance from the United States in overthrowing Mossedegh′s fledgling democracy. Kermit Roosevelt, Teddy′s grandson, led the successful coup in August 1953, which ended in the reestablishment of the Iranian monarchy in the person of Mohammad Reza Shah. Iranian anger at this foreign intrusion smoldered until the 1979 revolution. Meanwhile, over the next decade, the United States successfully overthrew other governments, such as that of Guatemala. Kinzer, a New York Times correspondent who has also written about the 1954 Guatemala coup ( Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala), tells his captivating tale with style and verve. This book leads one to wonder how many of our contemporary problems in the Middle East may have resulted from this covert CIA adventure. Recommended for all collections. Ed Goedeken, Iowa S tate Univ. Lib., Ames ( Library Journal, June 15, 2003) After the coup, an international consortium was organized to run the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which had named the National Iranian Oil Company by Mossadegh. Anglo-Iranian held 40% of the shares. The consortium agreed to share profits with Iran on a fifty-fifty basis, but still refused "to open its books to Iranian auditors or to allow Iranians onto its board of directors." (196). The hostage-takers were enraged against Americans and their support for the deposed Shah who had been allowed into the United States. The US regarded this crime not only as barbaric but also inexplicable. But was it so inexplicable? Many Iranians feared that Americans would help the Shah return to power as they once did in 1953. What stood behind the fears of many Iranians that the US could help the Shah return to Tehran and to power? The 1953 US engineered coup in Iran profoundly changed history. Despite Mossadegh’s worldwide 1951 fame, few Americans today would likely know who he was or how America took him down. Yet in Iran he is remembered by all as a hero. Thus most Americans cannot understand how Iranians see the US and the world. In 2015 we are still bearing the repercussions of colonialism exacerbated by Cold War tunnel vision. Kinzer offers up an apt quote from Harry Truman,” There is nothing new in the world except the history you don’t know.”

The basic facts of Operation Ajax have been known for some time, in part from "Kim" Roosevelt′s own memoir, in part from other sources, most notably a windfall of long–classified CIA documents leaked to Kinzer′s New York Times colleague James Risen in 2000. As the author notes, Mossadegh was not a pragmatist. He was more of a visionary and utopian. Had he been a pragmatic leader, he could have made different decisions and avoided a crises that eventually led to his downfall. He could have agreed to mediation offered by President Truman who wanted to avoid a stalemate. The communist takeover of China and the Korean War changed the way America viewed Iran. Foreign policy was now cast in terms of the Cold War. Still President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson remained anti-colonial. They refused to support Britain’s hardline stand and proposals for direct intervention in Iran. Acheson sent his assistant secretary George McGhee to Iran then followed up with the experienced Averill Harriman to try to negotiate a peaceful resolution. Despite the persistent effort of both men the British and Iranians remained intransigent. Iran took over the oilfields but had no capacity to run them. The British had never trained the Iranian workers who lived in abject poverty. Britain pulled out all its management and technicians and production stopped. Tell people today that the United Nations was once the center of the world the place where struggling nations got a shot at a fair hearing instead of a monkey trial before they were overthrown and most would probably shake their heads in puzzlement. meticulously documented throughout essential reading ( Medicine Conflict and Survival, Vol. 21(4) October 2005)Iran's struggle to modernize provokes questions. Should governments lease national resources? Should developed nations lease land from underdeveloped ones? Foreign investment could help develop domestic infrastructure. Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Co., agreed to 50% royalties in 1950 while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was paying 15%. When contracts were canceled the UK chose embargos and considered armed invasion, an avoidable crisis. Mossadegh′s Iran faced formidable foes: British oil executives, the C.I.A. and the brothers Dulles, all of whom come off wretchedly here. The least sympathetic of all are Iran′s erstwhile British rulers, who continued to gouge Iran via the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company. When the Truman administration prodded it to share the wealth with Iran, its chairman sniffed, "One penny more and the company goes broke." In 1951, to London′s fury, Mossadegh led a successful campaign to nationalize the oil company, drove the British to close their vital oil refinery at Abadan and became prime minister. The British began drafting invasion plans, but Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned them that gunboat diplomacy would hurt the West in its struggle with Moscow.